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Introduction
The Basel Committee is in the process of ﬁ  nalising a new 
Accord, known as Basel II, as a new regulatory frame-
work for banks. By making capital requirements more 
risk-sensitive, Basel II aims to further improve the ﬁ  nancial 
soundness of individual banks and so contribute to the 
soundness and stability of the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole. 
The question addressed in this paper concerns how this 
preliminary regulatory proposal, currently scheduled for 
implementation end 2006, is likely to affect the structure 
of bank lending in Belgium, and in particular its conse-
quences for SME lending.
Using detailed information on loans granted in Belgium as 
well as individual ﬁ  rm and bank balance sheet information, 
Section 1 of the paper documents the importance of SME 
lending in our country, which amounts to roughly 80 p.c. 
of total lending to ﬁ  rms. The data also indicate that the 
four large banks based in Belgium focus as much on SME 
lending as smaller banks, which means that the bulk of 
SME lending is granted by these four institutions. This fact 
is important because Basel II plans to offer banks a menu 
of regulatory possibilities with potentially different treat-
ments of different lending categories, and large banks are 
predicted to adopt the more sophisticated but also more 
costly-to-implement ‘Internal Ratings Based’ (IRB) system, 
rather than the simpler ‘Standardised Approach’ (SA).
Section 2 presents in detail the Basel II proposals under 
discussion. Before doing this however, the section dis-
cusses the regulatory framework facing banks, putting 
current regulatory reforms into a more general context. 
It stresses that regulation can be seen as trying to ‘mimic’ 
the discipline exerted by the sophisticated debtholders of 
non-ﬁ  nancial companies (these debtholders are typically 
banks) in a world where the banks’ debtholders do not 
perform this job, because they are dispersed, non-expert 
depositors (who are, moreover, protected by deposit 
insurance). This helps to explain the reliance of regulation 
on capital requirements with a threat of intervention/liq-
uidation of banks that do not comply with these require-
ments.
Ideally, these regulatory constraints should force banks 
to internalise the full economic value of equity capital. 
In reality, however, the regulatory constraint introduces 
biases of its own, because the relative ‘capital weights’ 
of various bank operations do not necessarily coincide 
with their ‘true economic weights’, that is, regulatory 
capital may differ from ‘risk-adjusted economic capital’. 
One can understand both Basel I and Basel II as attempts 
to minimise these biases. As detailed in Section 2, Basel 
I was a step in this direction. However, it was excessively 
favourable to OECD sovereign lending and discriminated 
against low-risk corporate lending, and Basel II tries to 
correct these problems.152
Basel II intends to make capital requirements more risk-
sensitive, and so contributes to a more efﬁ  cient allocation 
of capital. For the sake of comparison with Basel I, the 
Standardised Approach is brieﬂ   y discussed. It stresses 
that this approach speciﬁ  cally tries to reduce prior biases 
against safe ﬁ   rm lending and more risky lending. The 
speciﬁ  cs of the IRB approach are then discussed in detail. 
The section presents both the theoretical foundations 
for the approach, its dual perspective (the ‘foundation’ 
and ‘advanced’ versions, which differ in terms of the 
internal inputs the bank is able/obliged to supply), and 
its treatment of asset correlation. Indeed, in contrast 
with Basel I, the IRB approach of Basel II incorporates to 
some extent portfolio considerations in computing capital 
requirements. This leads in particular to a pro-SME effect, 
following the assumption that small ﬁ  rm risk has a lower 
correlation with aggregate risk than does large ﬁ  rm risk. 
Belgian data calculations conﬁ  rm this assumption and are 
in line with foreign studies.
Finally, in Section 3, the paper provides an overall esti-
mate of the impact of Basel II on capital requirements 
for both corporate and SME lending (1). While caution is 
clearly called for, we can offer the tentative conclusion 
that, relative to Basel I, capital requirements under Basel 
II for ﬁ  rm lending in Belgium should not automatically go 
up. This conclusion is of course reached ‘ceteris paribus’, 
i.e. assuming that banks’ risk-taking behaviour remains 
unchanged. A second tentative conclusion is that the IRB 
approach seems to produce lower capital requirements 
than the SA approach, and this conclusion obtains for 
large as well as small Belgian banks and for corporate 
as well as SME lending. This can only reinforce the pre-
sumption that the main Belgian banks will choose the IRB 
approach in the future. Sensitivity analysis suggests the 
robustness of these conclusions and is discussed at the 
end of Section 3. Further discussion is included in the last 
section, which concludes the paper.
1.  Bank lending to SMEs
In order to better understand the potential effects of Basel 
II on SME lending, this section provides some facts about 
the structure of this type of lending in Belgium. Basel II 
is going to offer banks a menu of approaches whose 
relative attractiveness will typically depend on bank size, 
given the ﬁ  xed cost of implementing the most advanced 
approaches. In order to determine how Basel II will affect 
Belgian banks’ capital requirements, it is therefore impor-
tant to understand which banks lend to which ﬁ  rms in 
Belgium. Before doing this, it is necessary to deﬁ  ne small /
large banks and ﬁ  rms.
1.1 Some  deﬁ  nitions
1.1.1  Large versus small banks
To distinguish between small and large Belgian banks, 
the 100  billion euro cut-off for total assets has been 
chosen. Table 1 clearly shows that this is a natural cut-off 
point. Furthermore, this cut-off point is often used in the 
empirical literature (see e.g. Berger et al., 2001), which 
distinguishes banks with respect to size, to differentiate 
between the two smallest bank asset classes. Note that 
the table only covers the banks that granted credit to non-
ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms in the period under consideration.
(1)  For a review of the impact of Basel I on capital requirements, see Jackson et al. 
(1999).
TABLE 1 BANK ASSETS BY SIZE CLASS
(June 2002; in billions of euro)
Source: NBB.
(1) Including Belgian subsidiaries since the Accord needs to be applied on a consolidated basis.
Number of banks Total assets 
(p.c. of total banking sector)
Mean Min. Max.
Large banks (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . 4 658.1
(87 p.c.)
164.5 100.7 271.8
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 69.7
(9 p.c.)
1.7 0.1 13.3
Foreign branches . . . . . . . . . 25 28.1
(4 p.c.)
1.0 0.0 4.4153
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The table stresses the overwhelming dominance, in asset 
terms, of the four large banks that operate in Belgium. 
We have already mentioned that large banks are likely to 
follow the IRB approach while small banks are more likely 
to adopt the SA approach. Foreign branches, on the other 
hand, will need to adopt the approach of their foreign 
parent banks. In what follows we will only concentrate on 
small and large banks.
1.1.2 Non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm exposure
We deﬁ  ne non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm exposures as put forward 
in the Basel II Accord. Basel II identiﬁ  es  3 types  of 
non-ﬁ  nancial  ﬁ   rm exposures  : exposures to corporates, 
exposures to corporate SMEs and exposures to retail 
SMEs. (BIS, 2003b) First, a corporate exposure is deﬁ  ned 
as a debt obligation of a corporation, partnership or 
proprietorship. Second, in the corporate portfolio, SME 
borrowers are deﬁ  ned as those with less than 50 million 
euro of annual sales on a consolidated basis. Third, loans 
extended to SME borrowers are eligible for the retail 
treatment provided the total exposure of the banking 
group to the individual ﬁ  rm is less than 1 million euro. The 
deﬁ  nition most often used in the empirical literature on 
SME lending (see e.g. Berger et al., 2001a) corresponds 
to the deﬁ  nition of retail SMEs in Basel II.
1.2  The importance of SME lending in Belgian 
banks’ loan portfolios
Empirically, identiﬁ   cation of SMEs according to this 
deﬁ  nition requires us to combine data from the Credit 
Register (CR), from which we have used information on 
utilised credit lines to Belgian ﬁ  rms  (2), and the Central 
Balance Sheet Ofﬁ   ce (CBSO), which provides balance 
sheet and income statement data for these Belgian ﬁ  rms. 
We used CR data based on June 2002. As information 
from the CBSO is not yet available for 2002, ﬁ  nancial 
information for the years 2001 and 2000 is used.  (3)
To provide a ﬁ   rst indication of the composition of the 
loan portfolios  (4) of large versus small Belgian banks, Table 
2 provides descriptive statistics relating to loan exposures 
TABLE 2 LOANS TO BELGIAN FIRMS AS A PERCENTAGE OF BANK ASSETS ACCORDING TO BANK AND FIRM SIZE
(June 2002; Bank-level data)
Source: NBB.
Corporate
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.15 2.18 1.60 2.64 0.52
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.47 0.00 0.00 21.24 4.49
Corporate SME
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.89 4.69 3.94 6.22 0.97
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.89 0.75 0.00 32.91 8.33
Retail SME
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.30 3.28 1.84 4.82 1.34
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.27 1.40 0.00 15.82 4.78
Total
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.34 10.04 8.42 12.86 2.14
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.63 4.17 0.01 48.92 11.75
(2)  The CR also contains information on credit lines to associations of ﬁ  rms (or associa-
tions of ﬁ  rms and individuals). As these lines count for only roughly 11 p.c. of total 
ﬁ  rm lending, we decided to disregard them.
(3)  When combining these two datasets, we noticed that there are exposures in 
the CR dataset for which no balance sheet information is available in the CBSO. 
Speciﬁ  cally, total coverage of CR data in the CBSO dataset is on average 90 p.c. 
in terms of exposure, and 83 p.c. in terms of number of debtors, when lending to 
associations is not taken into account. When this type of lending is included, the 
ﬁ  gures are 74 p.c. and 76 p.c. respectively. They also correspond to the coverage of 
75 p.c. of exposures calculated in Saurina and Trucharte (2002) for Spain, and they 
are higher than their total coverage in terms of number of debtors, which was on 
average only 45 p.c.. Saurina and Trucharte concluded from this that it was mainly 
for small ﬁ  rms that no ﬁ  nancial information was available. In their article there is 
no reference to the role of associations.
(4)  Exposures to public entities and educational institutions have been excluded as 
most of them are treated differently in Basel II.154
as a percentage of bank assets. Two conclusions emerge 
from the table. First, we see that, on average, large 
banks exhibit a portfolio composition similar to that of 
small banks in terms of proportion of assets devoted to 
SME lending. A difference exists for corporate lending, 
as large banks lend more to corporates in terms of assets 
than do small banks. However, there are large differences 
between banks, especially between small banks. Second, 
on average, in terms of bank assets, both large and small 
banks lend less to large Belgian corporates than to Belgian 
corporate SMEs or Belgian retail SMEs  (5). This highlights 
the very important role of SMEs in the Belgian economy.
Table 2 also indicates that small banks devote less of their 
total assets to ﬁ   rm loans than do large banks, which 
makes it difﬁ  cult to draw deﬁ  nite conclusions as to which 
banks specialise in lending to which ﬁ  rms. Therefore, Table 
3 gives an overview of the distribution of loans by ﬁ  rm 
class as a percentage of total loan exposures. Again, the 
table stresses the very important role of large and small 
banks for SME lending in Belgium. Further, it indicates 
that, although large differences exist between banks, 
small banks specialise more in loans to retail SMEs while 
large banks tend to specialise in loans to corporates and 
corporate SMEs. The latter observation is consistent with 
a large stream of research which has documented the fact 
that small banks invest a much higher proportion of their 
assets in small business loans. (See for example Berger 
and Udell, 1996, Peek and Rosengren, 1997, Strahan and 
Weston, 1998 and Berger et al. 1998, 2001a). Small and 
large banks may have a different lending focus because 
small banks face an exposure constraint. However, small 
ﬁ   rms may also be a natural customer base for small 
banks because of the different organisational structures 
of small and large banks. As the size and the complexity 
of the banking organisation increases, organisational 
diseconomies à la Williamson (1988) may raise the cost 
of transmitting the “soft” information  (6) related to SME 
lending through layers of management. (Stein, 2002 and 
Liberti, 2002).(7)
Tables 2  and 3  do not tell us much about the propor-
tion of SME lending that will be represented by banks 
adopting the IRB approach. An idea is provided by Table 
4, which gives information on the aggregate proportions 
to different ﬁ  rm classes accounted for by large and small 
banks.  (8) We can conclude that although small banks tend 
to specialise in small loans, an extremely high proportion 
of total SME loans are provided by large banks since large 
banks’ lending to all ﬁ  rm classes accounts for more than 
92 p.c.  of  total ﬁ   rm lending. If we accept the credible 
hypothesis that large banks will take the IRB road, we 
can conclude that IRB banks will account for most SME 
lending.
TABLE 3 COMPOSITION OF BANKS’ LOAN PORTFOLIO
(June 2002; Bank-level data; as percentage of loan exposures to Belgian firms)
Source: NBB.
Corporate
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.56 20.37 14.15 31.35 7.34
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.22 0.00 0.00 100.00 25.53
Corporate SME
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47.48 47.56 42.78 52.00 3.82
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.71 24.34 0.00 99.06 36.45
Retail SME
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.06 28.37 18.00 37.49 9.56
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.08 63.26 0.00 100.00 39.93
(5)  We may expect large banks to lend more to corporates when foreign ﬁ  rm lending 
is also included. Credit Register data, however, does not provide information on 
utilised credit lines to foreign ﬁ  rms.
(6)  Soft information can be deﬁ  ned as information that is initially not available in hard 
numbers and is difﬁ  cult to summarise in a numerical score (Petersen, 2002).
(7)  However, these organisational costs may be dampened by diversiﬁ  cation beneﬁ  ts 
which can be mainly exploited by large banks (See e.g. Black and Strahan, 2002)
(8)  The larger the total exposures to a ﬁ  rm class, the higher the risk weight assigned 
to these ﬁ  rms.155
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2.  The Basel II approach
2.1.  The regulatory context up to Basel II  (9) 
In order to evaluate banking regulation, it is important 
to start with the question  : what is special about these 
institutions that warrants regulation ? A key characteristic 
of  ﬁ   nancial institutions concerns the nature of their 
claimholders, i.e. depositors in the case of banks. Indeed, 
typical corporations have liabilities held by debt holders 
and by equity holders. The latter ones are “ in  control ” 
in good times and the former ones in bad times. In 
non-ﬁ  nancial companies, debtholders – which are often 
banks – are expected to play a major role in disciplining 
management in the case of ﬁ  nancial  distress,  in  order 
to avoid “  gambling for resurrection  ”, in particular. This 
requires expertise, and it is often a role played by banks 
(indeed, only large ﬁ  rms – backed by rating agencies – can 
get disintermediated debt). By contrast, banks, like several 
other types of ﬁ  nancial institutions, have liabilities held 
by depositors, i.e. dispersed non-experts. In such a case, 
there is a need for a debtholder representative, which is 
a fundamental role for the regulator. This is especially 
true since banks can take risks that could contribute to 
contagion or systemic risk.
How does the regulator act as a bank debtholder 
representative  ? First, by imposing constraints, in the 
form of capital requirements, which serve to ensure 
bank solvency and to avoid systemic externalities. 
Second, by threatening a “ get-tough-policy ” when 
these requirements are not respected, with the regulator 
taking control and possibly closing or selling the ﬁ  nancial 
institution. This broadly mimics the role of debt as a 
contingent control arrangement in non-ﬁ  nancial  ﬁ  rms, 
where control over the ﬁ  rm switches to creditors in bad 
times. Moreover, regulation is aimed at limiting the ability 
of shareholders to “ play with the deposit insurance fund 
money ”, something their debtholders  /  depositors care 
about insufﬁ  ciently if they feel at least partially protected 
by deposit insurance.
The general combination of capital requirements and 
control shifting to the regulator in the case of violations 
of the above rules is common to the regulation of banks, 
securities  ﬁ   rms and insurance companies. Speciﬁ  cs, 
however, differ between types of institutions. Since 
banks have a special role in bearing credit risk, this is 
the natural focus for banking regulation. In contrast to 
previous regulation, since 1988, the Basel I accord has 
tried to measure credit risk and has required banks to 
hold a capital of at least 8 p.c. of their “ risk-weighted 
assets (RWA)  ”. In this ﬁ  rst attempt at forcing banks to 
internalise the credit risk characteristics of their loans, four 
risk categories were considered each receiving a different 
risk weight (RW)  (10) : a risk weight of 0 for OECD sovereign 
risk; a risk weight of 20 for lending to OECD banks  ; a 
risk weight of 50 for residential mortgage lending  ; a risk 
weight of 100 for all other lending (including all lending 
to ﬁ  rms). (see BIS, 1988)
Basel I offered an improvement over previous regulation 
that essentially treated all lending in the same way but 
still discriminated in favour of sovereign lending as well as 
within ﬁ  rm lending, against ‘safe ﬁ  rms’ and in favour of 
‘ risky ﬁ  rms ’. As such, Basel I induces a form of regulatory 
arbitrage  : when banks ﬁ  nd that economic capital (11) for 
ﬁ   rm loans is signiﬁ   cantly below the 8  p.c. regulatory 
capital requirement, they have the incentive to minimise 
the difference between economic and regulatory capital 
by altering their lending behaviour towards riskier loans. 
Basel II aims to reduce this form of regulatory arbitrage.
Besides the risk of regulatory arbitrage, another shortcoming 
of Basel I regulation is the practice of computing total capital 
requirements by summing the requirements associated with 
individual elements on the asset side of the balance sheet. 
Although regulators were obviously aware of the potential 
diversiﬁ  cation effects linked to the size or composition of 
the portfolios held by ﬁ   nancial institutions, the difﬁ  culty 
in measuring them had largely prevented regulation 
from taking diversiﬁ  cation into account in Basel I. How to 
measure and incorporate diversiﬁ  cation effects is an issue 
that Basel II partially tries to address.
TABLE 4 DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS ACCORDING TO BANK 
AND FIRM SIZE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LOAN 
EXPOSURES TO BELGIAN FIRMS
(June 2002; Aggregate data)
Source: NBB.
Corporate Corporate SME Retail SME
p.c. of total exposure 20 49 31
of which
Large banks  . . . . 93.49 92.50 94.47
Small banks  . . . . 6.51 7.50 5.53
 (9) For a general treatment of this issue, see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).
(10)  Here we leave aside the question of capital requirements for off-balance-sheet 
operations, for the sake of simplicity.
(11) Economic capital is deﬁ  ned as the amount of capital needed for a portfolio such 
that there is only a small probability that losses may exceed capital. For a prescribed 
level of conﬁ  dence it is calculated as the conﬁ  dence quantile of the portfolio loss 
distribution minus the expected loss. In the literature, economic capital is also 
often called credit Value at Risk. 156
2.2  General philosophy of Basel II
The above section suggests that regulation is clearly helpful 
in limiting risk-taking by banks, by forcing them to ‘ play with 
their own money ’ : if they are forced to stay above the 8 p.c. 
capital threshold at all times, the externality from deposit 
insurance is eliminated. And one can hope that, in general, 
imperfections in reporting systems and regulatory lags are 
not so severe that an 8 p.c. rule would be insufﬁ  cient to 
‘catch violators’ before their capital becomes negative.
While the Basel II Accord has not been ﬁ  nalised (12), current 
plans give a good idea of its philosophy. The accord is 
relatively complex and multi-faceted, and we do not aim 
to summarise it in all its dimensions here. The proposal is 
based on three pillars :
1.A system of minimum capital requirements.
2.Supervisory review in which supervisory authorities 
assess banks risk control systems and capital adequacy 
policies.
3.The use of market discipline as a lever for strengthening 
disclosure.
As most elements for the treatment of SME exposure 
are included in the ﬁ  rst pillar, we will focus on principles 
developed in this pillar. The New Accord maintains the 
level of the minimum capital requirement at 8 p.c. of RWA 
but adds the RWA for operational risk to the RWA for 
credit risk and market risk (13). In what follows, we will con-
centrate on the calculation of minimum capital require-
ments for credit risk. More speciﬁ  cally, we will focus on 
changes in risk weights relative to Basel I, the incorpora-
tion of asset correlation effects, and their implications for 
the speciﬁ  c treatment of SME lending.
A key feature of the ﬁ   rst pillar of Basel  II is that it 
presents two options for the measurement of credit 
risk  : the SA and the IRB approach. (14)  Within the IRB 
approach the Accord gives two methods for calculating 
risk capital charges : the ‘ Foundation IRB Approach ’ and 
the  ‘Advanced IRB Approach  ’. Banks are encouraged 
to move along the spectrum of available approaches 
as they develop more sophisticated risk measurement 
systems and practices. The SA is closer to Basel I, and 
is expected to be adopted by smaller institutions. The 
IRB approach relies to some extent on internal risk 
calculations by banks, implying a ﬁ   xed set-up cost 
that, in the ﬁ  rst instance, may only be worthwhile for 
bigger institutions on average (since the gain of a more 
‘ tailor-made ’ system will typically grow with asset size). 
So, although most SME lending in Belgium is likely to 
be granted in the future by banks adopting the IRB 
approach, it is useful to spend some time ﬁ  rst on the 
standardised approach, to understand better what Basel 
II implies relative to Basel I.
2.3  The Standardised Approach
This approach differs from Basel I essentially in making 
the capital requirement depend on external ratings 
(by nationally certiﬁ   ed rating agencies, e.g. Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s or Fitch). Speciﬁ  cally, the risk weights 
are as detailed in Table 5. Risk-weighted assets are then 
calculated by multiplying these risk weights by credit 
exposures.
TABLE 5 RISK WEIGHTS BY RATING BUCKET
Source: Basel (2001a).
Rating AAA to AA– A+ to A– BBB+ to BBB– BB+ to BB– B+ to B– Below B– 
and defaulted
Unrated
Sovereigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 20 50 100 100 150 100
Banks 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 50 100 100 100 150 100
Banks 2
< 3 months  . . . . . . . . . . . 20 20 20 50 50 150 20
> 3 months  . . . . . . . . . . . 20 50 50 100 100 150 50
Corporates   . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 50 100 100 150 150 100
(12) The Committee released a ﬁ  nal consultation paper on the 29th April 2003 and is 
planning to agree on the new Accord by the end of this year. (BIS, 2003b)
(13) RWA for market risk need to be calculated as put forward by the Committee in 
1996. The amendment allowed banks, for the ﬁ  rst time, to use their own internal 
models. (BIS, 1996)
(14)  Note that supervisory authorities may require systemically important banks to 
adopt the IRB approach. 157
BASEL II AND SME LOANS
Moreover, residential mortgages would carry a 35  p.c. 
weight, while other ‘ retail  exposures ’ would carry a 
75 p.c. weight.
The key adjustments to Basel I are thus :
1.Reﬁ  ned treatment of sovereign lending relative to the 
Basel I system of 0 p.c. for OECD States and 100 p.c. 
for non-OECD States. There will thus be, in particular, 
‘ tougher ’ treatment of some OECD sovereign 
lending.
2.Reﬁ   ned treatment of interbank lending, where two 
options are possible  : either according to the sovereign 
rating where the bank is incorporated (“ option  1 ”) 
or according to the bank’s own rating (“ option  2 ”, 
with preferential treatment for maturities of less than 
3  months). On average, OECD interbank lending 
receives a higher capital requirement.
3.A drop in the residential mortgage requirement from 
50 p.c. to 35 p.c..
4.Reﬁ   ned treatment of lending to ﬁ   rms, with two key 
effects  : (i) more favourable treatment of ﬁ  rms  that 
have a good rating but harsher treatment of ﬁ  rms with 
bad ratings; (ii) unchanged treatment of ﬁ  rms that are 
unrated, except for ‘ retail  lending ’, where the capital 
requirement is down from 100 p.c. to 75 p.c..
Banks are also allowed to take account of several credit 
risk mitigating techniques, such as collateral, guarantees, 
credit derivatives and netting arrangements. Where 
banks take eligible collateral, which has been expanded 
to include most types of ﬁ  nancial instruments, they are 
allowed to reduce their credit exposure to take account 
of the risk mitigating effects of the collateral. Banks may 
opt for different approaches. For guarantees and credit 
derivatives a substitution approach will be applied. The 
portion of the exposure that is protected will be assigned 
the risk weight of the protection provider. To the extent 
that there are netting arrangements, banks will be 
allowed to calculate capital requirements on the basis of 
net credit exposures.
Let us make two comments on the standardised approach 
at this point : First, note that the regulation would seem 
to suggest that, at least for ﬁ   rms wishing to access 
capital markets, being unrated is on average a bad thing; 
that is, good ﬁ  rms presumably ﬁ  nd it proﬁ  table to get 
rated. This has been analysed in the economics literature 
on ‘  disclosure of hard information  ’ (see Grossman and 
Hart (1980), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), and 
Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990). This literature shows how 
such information naturally gets disclosed in equilibrium. 
This is called the ‘ unraveling  argument ’  : since it pays 
to disclose whenever one’s private information is 
favourable, the ‘ market ’ will ‘  assume the worst  ’ when 
disclosure does not take place.
However, this unraveling argument will not apply fully if, 
for example, it is very costly for a ﬁ  rm to access capital 
markets (it will only need a rating if it accesses these 
markets) or if there is a ﬁ  xed cost entailed in disclosing 
information. In this case, non-disclosure only means that 
the gain from accessing capital markets or disclosing 
information is less than the cost. While very favourable 
information will be disclosed, the undisclosed information 
is not necessarily the most damaging. The higher the cost 
of disclosure, the less unfavourably one should look at 
non-disclosure.
If we apply this view to Basel II, since only ﬁ  rms that plan 
to access capital markets get rated and since getting 
rated involves a ﬁ  xed cost, which is a more signiﬁ  cant 
hurdle for SMEs, this is a justiﬁ   cation for the lower 
capital requirement of retail lending relative to other ﬁ  rm 
lending  : retail lending involves unrated ﬁ  rms, but their 
lack of rating is due much more to the cost of accessing 
capital markets than the possibly unfavourable ﬁ  nancial 
situation of the ﬁ  rm.
A second justiﬁ  cation for the more favourable regulatory 
treatment of retail lending seems to come from the desire 
to have a ‘ level  playing  ﬁ  eld ’ between the standardised 
approach and the IRB approach, and has to do with the 
fact that retail default has a lower correlation to aggregate 
movements than corporate default (see below). Indeed, 
while the standardised approach keeps the idea of summing 
individual capital requirements, thereby leaving aside any 
explicit portfolio considerations, one can see the ‘ retail 
correction ’ as a means of taking on board this diversiﬁ  cation 
effect in a simple (and admittedly crude) way.
2.4  The IRB approach
The second approach that the Basel Committee envisages 
for the determination of regulatory capital is based on 
internal ratings systems. Banks are allowed to use their 
own internal ratings, subject to supervisory approval, to 
assign a wide range of risk weights to corporate, bank, 
sovereign and retail exposures. The weights planned 
under the IRB approach exhibit much higher risk-sensitivity 
than those under the standardised approach.158
2.4.1 Risk  weights
The general risk weight curve for corporate, sovereign, 
banks and retail portfolios (15) transforms risk components 
(PD – Probability of Default, LGD – Loss Given Default and
 – correlation) into capital requirements. The main part of 
this risk weight function is based on a structural-approach 
portfolio model in which the correlation is the free 
parameter. See Box 1 for a discussion of the theoretical 
foundation of the following risk weight curve :
    
where :
 = capital requirement
 = standard normal function
 = inverse standard normal function
 = asset correlation (see formulae below)
 = conﬁ  dence interval – set by Committee at 99.9 p.c.
We can think of the risk weight formula as being the marginal 
contribution of a debtor to bank risk, i.e. the additional 
capital a bank needs to hold to protect itself against the 
risk of a single extra exposure (see Box). For the corporate, 
sovereign and interbank curve, the capital requirements are 
adjusted for maturity (M). For retail exposure, the capital 
requirement curve contains no explicit maturity adjustment. 
Risk-weighted assets can then be obtained by multiplying 
the derived capital charge by 12.5  (16) (to obtain the RW) 
and by the exposure at default (EAD). Note that capital 
requirements, and thus the risk-weighted assets, increase 
with the probability of default, the loss given default, the 
asset correlation and, when it applies, the maturity of the 
exposure.
Parameters of this risk weight function, and especially 
the parameters of the correlation formula (see below), 
were adjusted to ﬁ   t the goal of keeping the average 
economy-wide requirement unchanged at the current 
8 p.c. This calibration of the IRB capital requirements has 
occurred within a simpliﬁ  ed portfolio model to cover both 
unexpected and expected credit losses (see Box). This 
seems at ﬁ  rst sight counter-intuitive, as capital is intended 
to provide a cushion against unexpected losses, while 
provisioning and (at origination of the loan) loan prices 
need to provide a cushion for expected loss. However, there 
are several reasons for the Committee’s decision. First, this 
is to prevent loan loss provisions that are considered eligible 
for capital (up to a maximum of 1.25 p.c. of risk-weighted 
assets) from also being used to cover for expected loss 
(‘double gearing’). Furthermore, this prevents problems 
that may arise from differences in provisioning practices 
between countries. And ﬁ  nally, it prevents difﬁ  culties that 
supervisors may experience when validating estimates of 
future margin income. However, as there are conceptual 
arguments for taking provisioning and prices into account 
in the calculation of capital, the Basel Committee decided 
to include the following two elements. First, under certain 
conditions, banks may reduce risk-weighted assets by the 
difference between 12.5  times the provisions and the 
expected loss portion of the risk-weighted assets (which 
is calculated as 12.5*PD*LGD*EAD) in a given class. And 
second, for qualifying revolving retail credit such as credit 
cards, which exhibit a high ratio of future margin income 
to expected losses, the expected loss portion of the risk-
weighted assets can be reduced by 12.5  times future 
margin income (see BIS, 2001b).
As already mentioned above, there are two variants 
within the IRB approach  : the IRB foundation and the IRB 
advanced approach. Under both approaches, the capital 
charge required to cover credit risks depends on the same 
components  : PD, LGD, EAD, correlations and maturity M. 
However, they differ mainly in terms of the inputs that 
need to be estimated by the bank and those speciﬁ  ed by 
the Committee (see Table 6 and see the following section 
for the treatment of correlations). Under the foundation 
approach, banks must assign each borrower to an internal 
rating bucket and allocate an average PD to each of the 
rating buckets. Other components such as LGD, EAD and 
M are set by the Committee. At national discretion, matu-
rity values can be provided by banks based on own esti-
mates. Under the advanced IRB approach, banks must pro-
vide their own estimates of PD, LGD, EAD and M. For retail 
exposures, there is no distinction between the foundation 
and advanced approaches, and banks must provide their 
own estimates of PD, LGD and EAD for these exposures. In 
general, the advanced approach is expected to be adopted 
by more sophisticated institutions and is intended as the 
starting point for accepting the use of banks’ own credit 
risk portfolio models in determining regulatory capital.
(15) Capital requirements for other portfolios, such as specialised lending (i.e. project 
ﬁ  nance, object ﬁ  nance, commodities ﬁ  nance, income-producing real estate and 
high-volatility commercial real estate), purchased receivables, and equity portfolios 
are subject to another speciﬁ  c treatment.
(16) The inverse of the current minimum 8 p.c. risk-based capital requirement.159
BASEL II AND SME LOANS
Theoretical foundation of the IRB risk weight curve
The model used by the Basel Committee to calibrate the risk weight functions of the IRB approach is derived from 
a structural-approach portfolio model.(1) The roots of these models can be found in the seminal papers by Merton 
(1977) and Black and Scholes (1974). Structural-approach models typically postulate some explicit microeconomic 
model of the process that determines the default of the individual debtor  (2). In these models, a borrower’s ﬁ  nancial 
position is driven by underlying latent variables, which are determined by common risk factors and idiosyncratic 
risk factors. In this box we discuss the theoretical foundations of the risk weight function and its underlying 
assumptions. (see also Gordy, 2000, 2003)
The model that underlies the Basel proposal is a one-factor model, which implies that there is only one systematic 
risk factor common to all debtors. The state of borrower   is driven by the latent variable   , which is deﬁ  ned as 
a linear function of a single systematic factor   and an idiosyncratic risk component 
    (1)
where   can be thought of as the weight with which the latent variable of an individual obligor is driven by the system-
atic risk factor  . The variables   and   follow a standard normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, and   and 
are independent for every obligor  . The weights of the two components are chosen so that   is also standard normally 
distributed. The common factor affects all companies equally and represents the state of the economy, i.e. the systematic 
risk. The idiosyncratic risk component affects one speciﬁ  c borrower and represents the diversiﬁ  able risk.
The model is a default-only model, assuming the ﬁ  rm to be in a state of either default or of non-default. As default 
occurs when   is below a critical threshold value   at a certain horizon, and rearranging formula (1), we obtain
        ( 2 )
(1)  In general, there are two main correlation estimation procedures: the structural approach and the reduced-form approach. Reduced form models assume a particular 
relationship between the default rate and some background factors, which represent systematic factors. To the extent that two obligors are sensitive to the same set 
of background factors, their default probabilities will move together.
(2)  The best-known industry models of portfolio risk using a structural - based approach are the RiskMetrics Group’s CreditMetrics and KMV’s Portfolio Manager.
TABLE 6 INPUT FACTORS SPECIFIED BY BANKS AND/OR 





PD  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bank Bank Bank
LGD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Committee Bank Bank
EAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Committee Bank Bank
M   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Committee 
or Bank
Bank N.A.
Compared to the SA approach, a wider range of collateral 
is accepted. In addition to the eligible ﬁ  nancial collateral, 
other collateral types such as receivables, and residential 
and commercial real estate can be taken into account in 
the value of LGD. As physical collateral is often used in 
lending to SMEs, this favours SME lending. Under the 
foundation approach, the risk-mitigating effects of guar-
antees and credit derivatives are recognised as follows  : 
for the covered portion of the EAD, a risk weight function 
may be used which is speciﬁ  c to the type of protector 
and the PD speciﬁ  c to the protector’s rating may be used. 
Under the advanced approach banks may choose whether 
the guarantee is reﬂ   ected through the probability of 
default or through the LGD estimates. On-balance-sheet 
netting of loans and deposits is recognised under certain 
conditions on EAD.
An important element of the IRB framework is also the 
treatment of credit risk mitigants such as collateral, 
guarantees, credit derivatives and netting arrangements. 
Box 1160
From this we can derive the probability of default conditional on the realisation of the systematic risk factor  .
         (3)
where   is a standard normal distribution function. Once we have conditioned on the common factor, the 
individual obligor defaults are driven only by own idiosyncratic terms and are independent for other defaults. This 
independence justiﬁ  es the Basel decision to apply risk bucketing rules.
As the latent variable is a standard normal variable, this threshold value   is equal to     where   is the 
unconditional probability of default, i.e. the average value of the conditional default probability across all possible 
realisations of the systematic risk factors.
A random expected loss given default rate (LGD) is introduced that is independent and has mean  . The 
conditional portfolio loss is then equal to
   
If the number of loans in a portfolio goes to inﬁ  nity, i.e. the portfolio is asymptotically ﬁ  ne-grained, the variance 
of the portfolio is completely determined by the variance of the market, as the speciﬁ  c risk contributes no volatility 
to a well-diversiﬁ  ed portfolio. Therefore, it is possible to map the percentile   of the X-distribution to the 
portfolio percentile to account for portfolio variance. Banks typically hold reserves and capital sufﬁ  cient to cover 
this percentile of the distribution of portfolio loss over the horizon.
       (4)
We can replace the weighting parameter   by  , which stands for the average value of the asset correlation. 
Since we have assumed that idiosyncratic factors are independent, correlations between latent variables are due to 
the existence of the systematic risk factors. The degree of correlation between defaults is determined by the sensitivity 
of the latent variables to the systematic factor, that is by   of the latent variables of two obligors, as shown by
   
Using this result, the conditional portfolio loss function looks as follows :
       (5)
This function appears to be an important input factor of the IRB risk weight function and can be interpreted as a 
benchmark in terms of marginal value at risk for the capital required for an individual loan. To arrive at the risk weights 
the function is multiplied by an adjustment that allows for the maturity of the exposure and by 12.5 p.c. The IRB 
capital requirements are calibrated within this simpliﬁ  ed portfolio model (assuming a one-factor model and portfolio-
invariant capital requirements) and cover thus both expected (deﬁ  ned as     ) and unexpected credit losses.161
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 2.4.2 Asset correlations
The risk of individual loans can be assessed by different 
drivers of credit risk such as PD, LGD and EAD. To assess 
the risk of a credit portfolio, however, it is not sufﬁ  cient 
to simply aggregate the individual risks; it is also necessary 
to take into account the correlations of the risks between 
the assets in the portfolio. These correlations determine 
by how much the loss on a portfolio is reduced by 
diversiﬁ   cation across debtors, industries and regions. 
Although there has been much progress in recent years 
in the estimation of correlations across exposures in a 
portfolio, there is not at present a single, well-accepted 
“best-practice” for calculating them. Estimating 
correlations is indeed considered to be one of the central 
challenges for quantifying portfolio credit risk.
The Basel Committee (BIS, 1999) recognises that an 
approach based on a full credit risk portfolio model that 
takes into account the effect of correlations may bring 
regulatory capital into closer alignment with the perceived 
riskiness of the assets and portfolio concentrations. For a 
number of reasons, however, Basel II does not allow for a 
full portfolio-based approach in the assessment of credit 
risk. First, a lack of data on individual bank portfolios hin-
ders the reliable estimation of the correlations between 
different exposures. This lack of data is due partly to the 
infrequent character of default events and the relatively 
longer-term time horizon used in the calculation of credit 
risks. Furthermore, the lack of data prevents appropriate 
back-testing of the models. This is in sharp contrast with 
market risk models, which typically can make use of daily 
data.
Second, correlation estimates are subject to several 
methodological issues. Different assumptions, e.g. on the 
distribution function, made in different credit risk models 
to calculate correlations may affect the loss distributions. 
There appears to be no theoretical answer as to what the 
value of the average asset correlation should be. In the 
end, it is an empirical question whether the correlations 
calculated by the different models are acceptable in size 
and whether they are stable over time.
Given the data and the methodological limitations 
involved in calculating correlations, the Basel Committee 
decided not to allow banks to calculate the correlations 
themselves, but rather to incorporate correlations in 
a more indirect manner. Following empirical research, 
the Committee incorporated variables reﬂ  ecting  some 
of the characteristics displayed by correlations into the 
regulatory formula; in particular, a decreasing relationship 
between asset correlation and the probability of default 
is incorporated, and a positive relationship between ﬁ  rm 
size and correlation is introduced. Thus, although the risk 
weight curve is based on a structural portfolio model, 
asset correlations are introduced in a more indirect way, 
dependent on PD and ﬁ  rm size.
The correlation formulae that are put forward by the Basel 
Committee vary for different asset portfolios and are set 
as follows :
1. sovereign, corporate and interbank exposures :
Correlations are a decreasing function of the probability 
of default, and they vary between 12 p.c. for low quality 
exposures and 24  p.c. for high quality exposures. For 
corporate SMEs, there is a ﬁ   rm-size adjustment to the 
corporate risk weight formula :
where S is expressed as annual sales in millions of euros 
with values of S falling in the range of less than or equal 
to 50 million euros or greater than or equal to 5 million 
euros. Firms with annual sales of less than 5 million euros 
will be treated as if their sales were equal to 5 million 
euros for the purposes of the ﬁ  rm-size adjustment. The 
formula shows that the smaller the ﬁ  rm size, the lower 
the asset correlation and hence the lower the ultimate 
capital requirement. On average, this size-adjustment 
may reduce the capital requirements by 20 p.c. for the 
smallest ﬁ  rms.
2. retail exposures :
For exposures secured by residential mortgages, asset 
correlation is ﬁ  xed at the level of 15 p.c.. This rather high 
correlation takes into account the fact that mortgage loans 
are in general long-term loans (recall that there is no matu-
rity adjustment for retail exposures) which may be greatly 
affected by the business cycle. Banks will be allowed to 
apply the following formula for correlations for their SME 
exposures so long as the total exposure of the banking 
group to the SME is less than 1 million euro and provided 
that those exposures are managed in a way similar to retail 
exposures. This implies that they should be treated con-
sistently over time and in the same manner as other retail 
exposures and that they must not be managed individually 
but as a part of a portfolio segment. (BIS, 2003b, § 200)162
 
Correlations thus vary between 2 p.c. for low quality retail 
lending and 17 p.c. for high quality retail lending.
The asset correlation curve for qualifying revolving retail 
credit is very similar to the one for loans to retail SMEs; 
correlations vary between 2  p.c. and 11  p.c. while the 
value 35 needs to be replaced by 50.
To show the impact of these different correlation formulas 
on the risk weight curve for non-ﬁ  nancial  ﬁ  rms,  Chart 
1 reports the risk weight curves for loans to corporates, 
corporate SMEs and retail SMEs under the assumption 
of a 45  p.c. LGD (which is the value put forward by 
the Committee for senior unsecured claims under the 
foundation approach), a maturity of 2.5 years, (which is 
the value for banks using the foundation approach) and 
annual sales of 5 million euros (for the purposes of the 
ﬁ  rm-size adjustment for SME borrowers). The risk weight 
curve for exposures to retail SMEs is both lower and 
less steep than the risk weight curves for exposures to 
corporate SMEs and corporates.
2.4.3  Rationale of PD and size dependence of correlations
The box has shown that the risk weight formula is based on 
a one-factor model in which the correlation factor measures 
the exposures against systematic risk. Basel incorporates a 
lower correlation factor for smaller ﬁ  rms, which implies that 
these ﬁ  rms are less vulnerable to systematic risk than larger 
ﬁ  rms. Although small ﬁ  rms have on average a higher default 
rate than large ﬁ   rms, the weak sensitivity to systematic
risk of small ﬁ   rms favours a reduction in the SME risk 
weight. Two arguments can be found in the literature that 
explain this positive size dependence of correlation.
First, large ﬁ  rms may be more sensitive to systematic risk 
because they are better diversiﬁ  ed than SMEs (see e.g. 
Lopez et al. (2002)). Larger ﬁ   rms generally have many 
divisions in many markets, and thus superﬁ  cially resemble 
diversiﬁ   ed portfolios of smaller ﬁ  rms.  According  to  the 
theory of portfolio diversiﬁ  cation, we may expect those 
diversiﬁ  ed portfolios to resemble more closely the general 
economy and less idiosyncratic elements. Although SMEs 
have on average a higher default rate, it is due mostly 
to idiosyncratic risk, which can be diversiﬁ  ed away in a 
large portfolio. The positive effects of diversiﬁ  cation may 
explain the decreasing relationship between asset corre-
lation and ﬁ  rm size as reﬂ  ected in the Basel correlation 
formulae. However, Roll (1988) has found that portfolios 
of smaller ﬁ  rms, which were constructed to match large 
ﬁ  rms in asset size, were more exposed to systematic risk, 
in terms of R², than the size-matched large ﬁ  rms.
Second, Düllmann and Scheule (2003) argue that ﬁ  rm size 
may serve as proxy of the business sector dependency of 
the correlations, since sectors which are more correlated 
to the state of the economy are dominated by large ﬁ  rms 
while sectors which are less prone to systematic risk are 
dominated by small ﬁ   rms. They found support for this 
hypothesis with German data. Sectors such as manufactur-
ing, construction and automotive have a higher percentage 
of large ﬁ  rms, while sectors such as transport & commu-
nication services, health and ﬁ  nancial services and other 
public services have a higher percentage of small ﬁ  rms.
Empirical studies have also found support for the 
relationship between ﬁ   rm size and correlation. Lopez et 
al. (2002) constructed portfolios of American, Japanese 
and European ﬁ  rms and calculated asset correlations using 
the KMV methodology using equity returns as input data. 
Another stream of research (see Sironi and Zazzara (2001) 
on Italian data, Düllmann and Scheule (2003) on German 
data and Dietsch and Petey (2003) on French and German 
data) calculated correlations using historical default rates. 
Also, initial estimates of correlations with Belgian data 
conform to the hypothesis of positive size-dependency of 









CHART 1  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENTS (k) AND PROBABILITIES 
OF DEFAULTS (PD) NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS 
 (In  percentages)
 (1) 
Source : BIS (2002).
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correlations (see infra). Although all studies found an 
increasing relationship between ﬁ  rm size and correlation, 
there is less uniformity in the literature related to the 
actual size of the correlations. The asset correlations for 
ﬁ  rms estimated in Lopez et al. are more in line with the 
ones proposed in Basel II  (17)  while in the other studies 
correlations are consistently lower. The underlying 
methodology and data may be the cause of these variations 
in results across studies. Two potential explanations exist 
for the low correlations in the second stream of research. 
First, the studies use a legal bankruptcy deﬁ  nition  of 
default, which is more restrictive than the deﬁ  nition put 
forward in Basel  (18). Second, correlations may have been 
underestimated as they were calculated from the total 
population. In general, a portfolio of banks contains fewer 
exposures. Some limited studies (Düllman and Scheule, 
2003 and Dietsch and Petey, 2003) that tried to address 
part of these problems found larger correlation estimates. 
However, they stayed well below the ones put forward by 
Basel II. In sum, studies analysing the relationship between 
ﬁ  rm size and correlations have shown that, although the 
level of the correlations and/or the relative correlations are 
not always in line with the Basel II proposal, they all conﬁ  rm 
the same ranking of correlations as the ones assumed in 
Basel II.
The negative relationship between PD and correlations 
appears to be somewhat counter-intuitive since empiri-
cally asset correlations increase during systemic crises, 
when PDs also tend to increase, which would suggest that 
correlation and PD are positively related. Furthermore, 
empirical research has not found support for the negative 
relationship between PD and correlations (see e.g. Carey 
(1998); Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2001), De Servigny and 
Renault (2002) and Dietsch and Petey (2002)) even after 
controlling for ﬁ  rm size (see e.g. Dietsch and Petey (2003) 
and Dülmann and Scheule (2003).
The assumed negative relationship between PD and 
correlations in the risk weight formulas may, however, be 
understood by the desire to reduce the procyclical effects 
of the Basel Accord. Excessively large capital charges for 
certain  ﬁ   rms could induce a credit rationing process, 
especially in periods of economic downturn, which may 
amplify the business cycle. If the correlations are made 
negatively dependent on PD, the risk weight curve 
becomes ﬂ  atter, thereby dampening procyclical effects.
3.  The implication for Belgian banks of 
the Basel II treatment of SME loans
The object of this section is to evaluate the implications of 
the Basel II accord on capital regulation for Belgian banks, 
given the special treatment of SMEs. We make use of the 
empirical distributions of loans in Belgian banks’ portfolios 
and calculate average PDs for differing ﬁ  rm  types  to 
estimate the capital requirements for Belgian banks. Here 
we focus on the SA and the foundation IRB approach.
3.1 Probabilities of Default
To get an idea of the PD of Belgian ﬁ  rms, we can make 
use of a database linked to the balance sheet register, 
which provides information on the Belgian ﬁ  rms entering 
bankruptcy procedures and the timing of these bankrupt-
cies. These data allow one to estimate PD by the average 
default rate of a given class of ﬁ  rms. As mentioned above 
(see footnote 20), this deﬁ  nition is more restrictive than the 
deﬁ  nition put forward by Basel. To obtain estimates of the 
default rates for corporate ﬁ  rms and corporate SMEs, we 
have linked data on entry into bankruptcy with data from 
the balance sheet register. To obtain estimates of the default 
rate for retail SMEs we need information on exposure size. 
As this information is not available in either data set, we 
have analysed the characteristics of the ﬁ  rms  classiﬁ  ed 
as retail SMEs in 2002 using the Credit Register dataset. 
We used information on asset values to identify corporate 
SMEs and retail SMEs which enables us to calculate a proxy 
for the PD for the retail SMEs category. Following examina-
tion of the percentiles of the asset values of corporate SMEs 
and retail SMEs, we classiﬁ  ed ﬁ  rms with an asset value of 
roughly 2 000 000  (19) euro as retail SMEs.
Table 7  presents the size distribution of the total ﬁ  rm 
population and of the ﬁ  rms that entered into default. We see 
that retail SMEs form the highest proportion of (defaulting) 
ﬁ   rms. Corporates represent only a minor proportion of 
total (defaulting) ﬁ  rms. The distribution of defaulting ﬁ  rms 
does not include ﬁ  rms that did not ﬁ  le a balance sheet. 
These  ﬁ   rms represent a rather large percentage of the 
total number of defaulted ﬁ  rms, on average about 34 p.c. 
Although we may assume that a signiﬁ  cant  proportion 
of these ﬁ  rms belong to the retail SME class  (20), in what 
follows we have decided to disregard them. Making 
assumptions on the size of these ﬁ  rms will inevitably lead 
to a bias. Furthermore, although adding them to the retail 
SME class increases the PD of this class, it does not have 
(17) Here we refer to the asset correlations included in the retail risk weight curve.
(18)  Basel II considers a default to occur when one of two events has taken place: 
the bank considers that the debtor is unlikely to pay its credit obligation to the 
banking group; or the debtor has failed to honour for more than 90 days any credit 
obligation to the banking group. (see BIS, 2003b, §414)
(19) The cut off point has been calculated as the average of the mid-point of the 90th 
and 80th percentile of the retail SMEs and the mid-point of the 20th and 10th 
percentile of the corporate SMEs. 
(20) The multiple reasons for not ﬁ  ling a balance sheet are for example: new established 
ﬁ  rms that did not have the time to ﬁ  le a balance sheet (±32 p.c.), ﬁ  rms that went 
bankrupt and never ﬁ  led a balance sheet (±20 p.c.), ﬁ  rms that disappeared for 
several other reasons, such as voluntary discontinuation (± 24 p.c.) and ﬁ  rms that 
do not have to ﬁ  le a balance sheet ( ±15 p.c.)164
an impact on the general conclusions (see Section 3.3 on 
sensitivity analysis). In any case, most defaulting ﬁ  rms for 
which  ﬁ   nancial information is available are classiﬁ  ed  as 
retail SMEs.
The following Chart 2 shows the 1-year default rates of 
corporates, corporate SMEs and retail SMEs. The data 
clearly show that bank loans to corporates are the least 
risky while the retail SMEs present the highest risks. The 
chart thus conﬁ  rms that the default rate tends to decrease 
on average with the size of the ﬁ  rms.  On  average, 
corporates have a default rate of 0.30  p.c., corporate 
SMEs a default rate of 0.89 p.c. and retail SMEs a default 
rate of 1.69 p.c. Furthermore, the default rates are volatile 
over time and over the business cycle as the ﬁ  gures for the 
standard deviations in Chart 2 below show. Note that the 
volatility of the PD decreases with size. As these default 
rates ﬂ  uctuate, we performed bootstrap simulations to test 
the stability of the average historical default rates. Results 
are presented in the annex. The analysis suggests that the 
observed average default rate provides us with a good 
proxy of the true average default rate. In what follows, we 
will therefore use the time-average of the one-year default 
rates over the period 1990-2001 to derive a credit rating to 
calculate capital requirements according to the SA and to 
plug into IRB the risk weight curve to calculate the capital 
requirements according to IRB foundation approach.
3.2 Capital  requirements
To calculate capital requirements for banks under the 
standardised approach, we need information on the credit 
ratings. Assigning a credit rating to the average PDs or 
assuming that corporates and corporate SMEs are unrated 
does not make much difference in the standardised 
approach, as a 0.30 p.c. one-year PD for corporates and 
a 0.89 p.c. one-year PD for corporate SMEs correspond 
to a BBB-rating and a BB-rating respectively (S&P, 2002), 
which are assigned a 100 p.c. risk weight, which is equal 
to the risk weight for unrated ﬁ  rms. Retail SMEs obtain a 
risk weight of 75 p.c. Information on the distribution of 
credit exposures per asset class reported in Table 3 is then 
combined with these risk weights to obtain total capital 
requirements for ﬁ  rm lending for each bank under the 
standardised approach.
As Section 2.4  has shown, we need more information 
on different input factors in order to calculate capital 
requirements for individual Belgian banks under the 
foundation IRB approach. As an estimate of the PD for the 
different asset classes, we used the average PDs calculated 
in the previous section  : 0.30  p.c. PD for corporates; 
0.89  p.c. PD for corporate SMEs; and 1.69  p.c. PD for 
retail SMEs. To compute the capital requirements for the 
corporate SMEs, it was also necessary to calculate a ﬁ  rm-size 
adjustment for each bank on the basis of the characteristics 
of their debtors (22). When available, we used annual sales 
TABLE 7 THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION AND DEFAULT RATES 
OF BELGIAN FIRMS
(Average 1990-2001; in percentages)
Source: NBB.
Corporate Corporate SME Retail SME
Total firms . . . . . . . . . 0.5 8.3 91.2
Total firms entering 
bankruptcy   . . . . . . 0.2 4.4 95.4
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CHART 2  PROBABILITIES OF DEFAULT OF  
BELGIAN FIRMS (21)


























(21) The calculations exclude the ﬁ  rms for which balance sheets are unavailable.
(22) It is no surprise that this size-adjustment S is larger for the loan portfolios of 
larger banks than for smaller banks. On average, e.g., the value of the variable 
S for large banks was 14 million euros while this was 4 million euros for small 
banks.165
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reported in the ﬁ  rms’ balance sheet. When there was 
no information on total sales (23), we used instead total 
assets, as suggested by the Basel Committee (see BIS, 
2003b, § 243). Furthermore, we assumed a 45 p.c. LGD 
(which is the value put forward by the Committee for 
senior unsecured claims under the foundation approach). 
Maturity is assumed to be 2.5 years (which is the value for 
banks using the foundation approach). This information 
is then plugged into the formulas presented in Section 
2.4  to compute capital requirements for credit risk for 
each bank. And ﬁ  nally, we have used information on the 
distribution of credit exposures per asset class reported 
in Table 3 to calculate total capital requirements for each 
bank.
Tables 8 and 9 present descriptive statistics on the capital 
requirements for credit and operational risk corresponding 
to each ﬁ  rm asset class and by bank size. These tables give 
an idea of the contribution of each ﬁ  rm class to total capi-
tal requirements. Table 8 assumes that all banks apply the 
standardised approach, and Table 9 assumes that all banks 
apply the IRB foundation approach. For the operational risk 
component of capital, we have assumed that the capital 
(23) In  Belgium,  ﬁ  rms that ﬁ  le an abbreviated balance sheet do not need to report 
turnover.
(24) As a point of comparison, the mean contribution of retail SMEs to total capital 
requirements under Basel I would have been 2.48 p.c. for large banks and 4.41 
p.c. for small banks. The contribution of corporates to total capital requirements 
under Basel I would have been on average 1.72 p.c. for large banks and 0.83 p.c. 
for small banks and for corporate SMEs it would have been on average 3.80 p.c. 
for large banks and 2.78 p.c. for corporate SMEs.
requirement is 10  p.c. of the total capital requirements, 
which is the target set by the Basel Committee.
The following conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, 
total capital requirements derived from the SA and IRB 
approach are mostly lower than the 8 p.c. put forward 
in Basel I, although the capital requirements for SA large 
banks exceed 8 p.c. when operational risk is taken into 
account. For SA banks this observation reﬂ  ects the fact 
that both large and small banks greatly beneﬁ  t from the 
risk weight reduction for retail SMEs in the standardised 
approach relative to Basel I. (24)  On the other hand, the 
beneﬁ  t to large SA banks of the reduction in risk weight 
for retail SMEs is counterbalanced by the additional 
operational risk requirements. The differences between 
small and large banks thus depend very much on the 
composition of the loan portfolios, as the main reason 
TABLE 8 CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (CREDIT PLUS OPERATIONAL RISK) PER ASSET CLASS 
ASSUMING ALL BANKS APPLY THE STANDARDISED APPROACH
(June, 2002; Bank-level data; in percentages of risk-weighted assets)
Source: NBB.
Corporate
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.92 1.81 1.26 2.79 0.65
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.91 0.00 0.00 8.89 2.27
Corporate SME
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.22 4.23 3.80 4.61 0.34
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.09 2.16 0.00 8.81 3.24
Retail SME
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.07 2.15 1.46 2.50 0.46
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.67 4.22 0.00 6.67 2.66
Total
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.20 8.17 8.06 8.40 0.15
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.66 7.48 6.67 8.89 0.89
Credit risk only (excluding operational risk)
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.38 7.35 7.25 7.56 0.14
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.90 6.73 6.00 8.00 0.80166
why small banks receive a lower total capital requirement 
than large banks is because small banks invest a higher 
proportion of their assets in retail SMEs. (25)
The ﬁ  gures in Table 9 reﬂ  ect the fact that all banks adopt-
ing the IRB approach greatly beneﬁ  t from using the IRB 
risk weight functions.  (26) On average, each asset class con-
tributes less to the total capital requirement than it would 
have under Basel I. The IRB approach is also favourable with 
respect to the Basel II SA approach in terms of capital, and 
this holds for both large and small banks and for each ﬁ  rm 
class. This is consistent with the aim of Basel to give banks 
incentives to move to more advanced approaches. (27) Fi-
nally, Table 9 reveals that the capital requirements vary sig-
niﬁ  cantly between banks, especially between small banks. 
This highlights the need for analysis of the PD- sensitivity of 
capital requirements (see the next section).
Not much empirical research has yet been published on 
the impact of Basel II on banks’ capital regulation. The 
Basel Committee has initiated a number of quantitative 
impact studies to calculate the impact on capital require-
ments of all the elements of the proposed approaches, 
and several banks participated in these studies. A general 
summary of the results is published for each study after 
completion of the exercise (see BIS, 2003a for an over-
view of the results of the last exercise) and the results 
have been used by the Basel Committee to calibrate the 
parameters of the risk weight function.
Saurina and Trucharte (2002) have analysed the aggre-
gate impact for Spanish banks of the Basel treatment on 
SMEs, however, they do not examine possible differences 
between individual banks. Furthermore, they do not take 
into account requirements for operational risk. They ﬁ  nd 
that for Spanish banks the difference between the SA 
and the IRB approach in terms of capital appears to be 
rather small. This result is primarily because of higher PDs 
obtained for Spanish ﬁ  rms.
(25) In the standardised approach, if we were to treat each ﬁ  rm class as a separate 
portfolio, we would obtain total capital requirements for corporates and corporate 
SMEs of 8.89 p.c. and for retail SMEs of 6.67 p.c. 
(26) In the IRB approach, if we were to treat each ﬁ  rm class as a separate portfolio, we 
would obtain the following capital requirements: corporates, 4.97 p.c. ; corporate 
SMEs , 6.93 p.c. for large banks and 6.61 p.c. for small banks  ; and retail SMEs, 
5.81 p.c.
(27) To smooth the transition period, the Basel Committee has decided to introduce 
in the ﬁ  rst two years after implementation a minimum ﬂ  oor capital requirement. 
The implementation year 2006 and the following year, IRB capital requirements 
for credit risk together with operational risk cannot fall below 90 p.c. of current 
minimum requirements. In the third year of implementation, the minimum will be 
80 p.c. of this level.
TABLE 9 CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (CREDIT PLUS OPERATIONAL RISK) PER ASSET CLASS 
ASSUMING ALL BANKS APPLY THE IRB FOUNDATION APPROACH
(June, 2002; Bank-level data; in percentages of risk-weighted assets)
Source: NBB.
Corporate
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.07 1.01 0.70 1.55 0.36
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.51 0.00 0.00 4.96 1.27
Corporate SME
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.80 3.85 3.32 4.27 0.39
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.61 1.74 0.00 7.62 2.81
Retail SME
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.63 1.65 1.05 2.18 0.56
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.20 3.68 0.00 5.81 2.32
Total
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.52 6.54 6.22 6.78 0.24
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.39 6.21 4.96 7.74 0.78
Credit risk only (excluding operational risk)
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.87 5.89 5.60 6.10 0.22
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.75 5.59 4.46 6.97 0.70167
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Our analysis suggests that the system seems to ‘push’ 
banks towards the IRB approach. Indeed, there are several 
additional factors which may reinforce the incentives 
suggested by the ﬁ   gures. First, credit risk mitigating 
techniques can lower capital requirements (especially 
given that IRB banks lending to SMEs will beneﬁ  t from 
the wider recognition of collateral (28)). Second, banks 
are not expected to move to the IRB approach simply 
because of capital relief. Other incentives, such as 
potential market pressure and willingness to improve risk 
management systems, may be important. Thirdly, through 
the supervisory review process in the context of the second 
pillar of the New Accord, supervisory authorities may 
require banks (in particular systemically important banks) 
to adopt the IRB approach. Finally, we need to be very 
cautious when drawing conclusions about such incentive 
effects, however, as we need to bear in mind that the 
evidence reported here is subject to the “ Lucas critique ”, 
namely that structural changes are likely to occur after the 
implementation of risk-based capital requirements which 
may affect the distribution of ﬁ  rm lending. Here the results 
were obtained for a given structure of bank lending.
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we perform an analysis to see how 
sensitive the results on capital requirements are to 
the PD. Analysing the impact of varying PD on capital 
requirements is important, given that it allows us to 
account for potential PD variations between banks’ 
portfolios. Furthermore, data limitations induced us to 
make some assumptions (e.g. we used a more restrictive 
deﬁ  nition of default) which may have biased the ﬁ  gures in 
the exercise. This suggests the importance of establishing 
and elaborating datasets, possibly as an industry-level 
(28)  If we for example decrease the LGD in Table 10 to 40 p.c., then capital 
requirements covering credit and operational risk for large banks have a mean of 
5.80 p.c. and for small banks 5.68 p.c.
TABLE 10 IMPACT ON CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS OF AN INCREASE IN PD BY ONE STANDARD DEVIATION
(June 2002; Bank-level data; in percentages of risk-weighted assets)
Source: NBB.
Probability of default
Corporate Corporate SME Retail SME
0.48 1.19 2.09
Credit risk plus operational risk
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.50 7.51 7.34 7.64 0.16
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.11 6.85 6.24 8.74 0.92
TABLE 11 IMPACT ON CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS OF AN INCREASE IN PD BY TWO STANDARD DEVIATIONS
(June 2003; Bank-level data; in percentages of risk-weighted assets)
Source: NBB.
Probability of default
Corporate Corporate SME Retail SME
0.66 1.49 2.49
Credit risk plus operational risk
Mean Median Min. Max. Stdev.
Large banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.29 8.35 8.02 8.42 0.18
Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.68 7.31 6.57 9.54 1.07168
initiative, which are compatible with the new Basel con-
cepts of PD, LGD and EAD.
For this analysis we make use of the information 
on PD standard deviations presented in Chart 2.
Table 8  shows the impact of an increase in PDs by one 
standard deviation on the ﬁ  gures presented in Table 9. This 
increases the PD for corporates from 0.30 p.c. to 0.48 p.c., 
for corporate SMEs from 0.89 p.c. to 1.19 p.c. and for retail 
SMEs from 1.69 p.c. to 2.09 p.c. As expected, we notice 
an increase in capital requirements. However, the general 
conclusions from the previous section remain the same.
In a next step, we investigate by how many standard 
deviations we need to increase the PD to bring capital 
requirements under the IRB approach in line with those 
under the SA. Table 9 shows that this implies increasing 
the PD by two standard deviations. As this covers 
variations between Belgian banks, we can safely conclude 
that the above-mentioned results are robust.
Conclusion
In this paper we have given an overview of the Basel 
II proposal with a special focus on the treatment of 
loans to SMEs, as these constitute an important part in 
Belgian banks’ portfolio. Moreover, we have analysed 
the rationale of this treatment and the implications of 
the proposal on capital requirements for SME lending. 
This has been performed by combining information on 
credits granted in Belgium and individual ﬁ  rm  balance 
sheet data. As the paper has highlighted the complexity 
of assessing the impact of the Basel II proposals on capital 
requirements for SME lending, its conclusion should 
therefore be treated with caution.
The lower risk weights that Basel II has put forward for 
loans to retail SMEs and to corporate SMEs for a given 
probability of default has been justiﬁ   ed by the special 
characteristics associated with SMEs. Although small 
ﬁ  rms have on average a higher default probability, Basel 
has argued that this higher risk is mainly caused by idi-
osyncratic risk which can be diversiﬁ  ed away in a large 
portfolio. The extent to which non-borrower-speciﬁ  c risk 
is responsible for default probability can be analysed by 
looking at correlations. Research on foreign and Belgian 
data has conﬁ  rmed the positive ﬁ  rm size dependence of 
asset correlation, as is assumed in Basel II.
From the analysis of the impact of the treatment of SME 
loans in Basel II, one can safely argue that ﬁ  rm lending 
will not be made more expensive in terms of capital 
requirements when moving from Basel I to Basel II. This is 
especially true of the IRB approach, which does seem to 
imply lower capital requirements than the SA approach 
for Belgian banks, whether for large or small banks or 
for corporates and SMEs. This can only reinforce the 
presumption that most SME lending in Belgium will be 
granted by banks operating under the IRB approach. 
Furthermore, it also suggests that Basel II does not seem 
to induce any credit rationing for SMEs.
In this empirical exercise, data limitations required us to 
make some assumptions (e.g. we used a more restrictive 
deﬁ   nition of PD), which may have slightly biased the 
ﬁ   gures in the exercise. This points to the importance 
of establishing and elaborating datasets, possibly as an 
industry-level initiative, which are compatible with the 
new Basel concepts of PD, LGD and EAD. However, 
the robustness exercises in Section 3  suggest that the 
uncertainty that surrounds the parameters of the model 
does not invalidate the results. Speciﬁ  cally, if one were to 
bring the capital requirement on aggregate ﬁ  rm lending 
to its Basel I level, individual average probabilities of 
default would have to reach levels that are in excess of 
observed entry rates into bankruptcy. Note that our results 
have nevertheless been obtained for a given structure of 
bank lending.
Finally, although far from an integrated portfolio 
management approach, Basel II is an important step 
towards the convergence of regulatory capital and 
economic capital. As banks develop more sophisticated 
risk measurement methods, they are encouraged to move 
along the spectrum of available approaches in Basel II. 
The most advanced approach is expected to be pursued 
by the most sophisticated institutions and is expected to 
pave the way for the eventual acceptance of the use of 
banks’ own credit risk portfolio models in determining 
regulatory capital. Basel II is a signiﬁ  cant step in the right 
direction which is likely to be followed by revisions which 
might lead to a full convergence between regulatory and 
economic capital.169
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(29)  The bootstrap analysis has also been performed by resampling the dataset 
50 000 and  100 000 times  and  no  signiﬁ   cant differences in the results were 
noticed.
TABLE 12 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON DISTRIBUTION 
OF SIMULATED PDS
Source: NBB.
Corporate Corporate SME Retail SME
Mean   . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.30 p.c. 0.89 p.c. 1.69 p.c.
Standard deviation   . . 0.0504 p.c. 0.0823 p.c. 0.1100 p.c.
Kurtosis  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8815 2.8684 3.0853
Skewness   . . . . . . . . . 0.1024 0.0426 –0.0448
Lower confidence 
level . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.21 p.c. 0.75 p.c. 1.47 p.c.
Upper confidence 
level . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.40 p.c. 1.06 p.c. 1.91 p.c.
Annex
Robustness on probability of default
As default rates may ﬂ   uctuate over time and with the 
business cycle (see e.g. Nickell et al, 2000), we tested 
whether the calculated default rates are stable by carrying 
out simulations on the historical default rate. Speciﬁ  cally, 
we performed a bootstrap analysis, which is a method for 
estimating the distribution of an estimator by resampling 
the data. The bootstrap procedure involves choosing 
random samples with replacement from a data set. It is 
based on the idea that the sample is a good representation 
of the underlying population. The bootstrap analysis is a 
type of non-parametric Monte Carlo analysis as it combines 
Monte Carlo methods with the analysis of real data. The 
main advantage of this method is that it preserves the 
distribution that may exist in the underlying data. See 
Greene (2000), Horowitz (1997) and Jeong and Maddala 
(1993) for a detailed description of the methodology.
We resampled the data sets 10  000  times (29) under  the 
assumption that the number of elements in each bootstrap 
sample equals the number of observations in the original 
data set. Table 10  reports some basic statistics on the 
histogram of the simulated PDs. They suggest that the 
resulting distributions resemble the normal distribution. 
Kurtosis is a measure of the tallness or ﬂ  atness of the 
distribution. In each class, the measure is close to 3, 
which is the kurtosis value of the normal distribution. 
However, in case of the corporate class and the corporate 
SME class, the value is slightly below 3 (platykurtic 
distribution). In case of the retail SME the kurtosis value 
is slightly above 3, (leptokurtic distribution). Skewness is 
a measure of asymmetry of the data around the sample 
mean. Again in all cases skewness is close to that of the 
normal distribution, that is, zero. Only the skewness of 
the retail SMEs is slightly negative, which indicates that 
data points are spread out more to the left of the mean. 
Table 10 reports the simulated histogram, postulating a 
95 p.c. conﬁ  dence level.. Both the lower and the upper 
conﬁ  dence level are very close to the simulated mean. 
This analysis suggests that the observed historic average 
default rate provides us with a good proxy of the true 
average default rate.